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NAFTA INTEGRATION: UNPRODUCTIVE FINANCE 
AND REAL UNEMPLOYMENT 
by Melvin Burke 
What do the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the peasant Zapatista 
rebellion in Chiapas, and the recent $50 billion "Mexican bailout" triggered by the free falling 
peso have in common? Are these events related and if so, how? What can we learn from 
Mexico's last financial crisis? What does all this portend for the future? These are some of the 
questions addressed in this paper. This critical analysis applied to NAFTA is political economic 
in perspective. It is argued that the agreement and its economic stratagem are not new, that 
NAFTA is not a free trade agreement, and that it is a "lose, lose" proposition which will worsen 
both the Mexican and the global crisis. Because official and corporate domination of information 
is an integral part of the brave "New World Order," this reality has been and will continue to be 
obscured, distorted, and denied. Nowhere has this been more glaring than with respect to 
unproductive financial capital and rising real unemployment. We begin with a synopsis of 
Mexico's current NAFTA crisis, followed by a brief history of the country's debt crisis of 1982. 
This will help us to discover the roots ofNAFTA, its raison d'etre, and its essence. 
A tale of two crises 
On November 17, 1993, the US House of Representatives passed the North American 
Free Trade Agreement which on January 1, 1994, became the law of the land in Canada, Mexico, 
and the United States of America. On this latter date, the indigenous peasants of Chiapas took up 
arms and launched an insurrection against the government of Mexico. Both the names of these 
revolutionaries and the date of their uprising are significant. The Zapatista Army of National 
Liberation, named after Emiliano Zapata, the Mexican revolutionary hero of 1917, timed the 
uprising to coincide with the implementation date ofNAFTA. 
The economic euphoria, celebrated in the cliche "win, win," which accompanied the 
signing of the agreement, lasted less than a year. On December 20, 1994, the government of 
President Emesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon abruptly devalued the Mexican peso by 14%. The 
government correctly reported that it could no longer continue financing the country's large trade 
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deficits and foreign debt service obligations while maintaining the peso at its overvalued 
exchange rate. The Mexican government simply exhausted its dollar reserves (the exact amount 
of which was always an official secret). Financial speculators (Mexicans and others, mostly from 
the United States) immediately lost a reputed $10 billion and exchanged their devalued pesos for 
dollars which fled the country-virtually overnight. This, in turn, caused the peso to be devalued 
by more than 45% and Mexico entered into its latest financial and economic crisis. President 
Clinton felt obliged to put together an international fmancial package of more than $50 billion to 
bailout (subsidize) Mexican investors and supposedly to "stabilize" global finance. These loans 
are reportedly guaranteed by Mexican oil export revenues, whatever that means. While this may 
seem like a great deal of money, it is worth remembering that Mexico has a foreign debt in 
excess of$140 billion and in 1995 had to repay $35 billion in short-term debt, including $17 
billion in dollar-dominated bonds called tesobonos. I Commercial banks had another $8 billion 
falling due in certificates of deposit redeemable in dollars. While the price for the US taxpayer 
seems high; it is already clear that this $50 billion is just the first installment. In addition to these 
monies, it is apparent that the latest devaluation of the US dollar, relative to the German mark 
and the Japanese yen, is related to the use of $20 billion of monies reserved for the stabilization 
of the dollar to support the peso. By committing these funds to Mexico, the US Treasury opened 
the door to foreign exchange speculators, who wasted no time in taking advantage of this new 
"window of opportunity." 
Nevertheless, the real cost will be borne by the Mexican people through a typical 
austerity program forced upon the country by the International Monetary Fund and the 
industrialized countries which control it. Mexico's latest austerity measures include a 50% 
increase in the VAT (sales) tax, a 35% increase in the price of gasoline, a 20% rise in electricity 
rates, and i 00% interest rates. Wages are officially limited to a 10% increase, while inflation is 
expected to be 40-45% annually. The government is further obligated, as the condition for IMF 
I Lecuano, R.A. "The latest economic bailout of Mexico," unpublished manuscript, 1995, 
p.4. 
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loans, to shrink the size of the government via privatization and budget deficit reduction.2 What 
is striking about this IMF package is that it is virtually identical to the others imposed upon 
Mexico after its 1982 default. Indeed, the crises themselves are similar and the whole is 
interrelated. Knowledge of the earlier Mexican debt crisis and IMF stabilization programs helps 
to understand the present situation and NAFTA. The 1982 debt and the 1995 NAFTA crises in 
Mexico were not isolated national phenomena. They were part of the greater global stagnation 
which has existed since at least 1970. Post World War II average annual growth rates for the 
world economy of 5% have been reduced to less than half that amount during the last two 
decades. Zero and even negative growth has been recorded in the last couple ofyears.3 In an 
attempt to develop the easy way, via foreign loans instead of domestic savings, the Mexican 
government borrowed billions of petro-dollars from private multinational banks at real interest 
rates ofless than 1 %, short-term. Much of this money was productively invested in oil with 
expectations that prevailing high world prices would continue. The rest remains unaccounted for 
and most likely ended up in US banks, bonds, stocks, and real estate. 
Mexico's foreign debt in 1979 was a manageable $29 billion.4 In October of that year, the 
US Federal Reserve Board adopted a monetarist policy of reducing domestic inflation by 
contracting the money supply and raising interest rates. Interest rates subsequently rose to 10% in 
1981 and to 16% in the first half of 1982, which induced a global recession.5 Mexico, unable to 
repay the loans, was obliged to refinance them at these usurious interest rates and its foreign debt 
rose to more than $85 billion by 1982. Financial capital flight from Mexico had, at this time, 
2 Houston Chronicle, "Highlights of Mexico's plan," Feb. 12, 1995, p. A22. 
J World Bank. 1992. World Development Report 1992, New York, Oxford Press; The 
Washington Post National Weekly Edition 1992. "The global gloom: the slowdown in the US, 
Europe and Japan has a ripple effect," Sept. 28-0ct. 4, 1992, pp. 6-8 . 
4 World Bank. 1984. External Public Debt o/Developing Countries, New York, Oxford 
Press, volume 1, August. 
5 Business Week. 1982. "Worry at the world's banks," September 6, p. 81. 
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soared to an estimated $36 billion.6 These monies were both attracted and repulsed abroad by 
high real interest rates and by the deficits, depression, devaluation, and inflation in Mexico. 
Then-President Lopez Portillo said that those responsible for this drain of finances "had taken 
from the country more money than all those who have exploited us since the beginning or our 
history. "7 By late 1982, Mexico's service charges on its foreign debt equaled more than 100% of 
its export earnings. On August 20th of that year, Mexico defaulted on its external debt 
obligations. 
The United States and the IMF responded to this earlier Mexican crisis by putting 
together a rescue package of loans conditional upon economic policy changes and institutional 
refonns being undertaken in Mexico. These IMF stabilization (later called structural adjustment) 
programs can be compressed into three broad goals: (1) privatization; (2) laissezJaire 
(deregulation); and (3) laissez passer (free trade). Ostensibly, these were the means to achieve 
stable finances, economic efficiency, and sustainable growth. But this did not happen in the case 
of Mexico and instead the means became the ends.8 The economic refonns of President Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994), institutionalized in the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
are but the historic continuation of these earlier IMF conditions for loans. 
When President Salinas, a Ph.D. economist trained at Harvard9, assumed office, the 
Mexican economy was increasingly dependent upon foreigners and rapidly underdeveloping. 
Capital flight had not been reversed, foreign investment had not been attracted, the economy had 
6 World Financial Markets. 1982. Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, New York. 
7 Jose Lopez Portillo, VI Infonne Presidencial, as cited in Ultimas Noticias, December 1, 
1986. 
8 For more on this subject, see Melvin Burke, "The beginning of the end of the IMF game 
plan," Public Administration Economic and Finance: Current Issues in the North American and 
Caribbean Countries 1988-1989, CIDE & NAFTA, Mexico City, 1989, pp. 330-344. 
9 President Zedillo is also a Yale-educated Ph.D. in economics. These new 
technocrats/politicians are not unique to Mexico. See, for example, "The Latin 'techno-yuppies' 
young and American-educated, they are shaking up state-run economies across South America," 
Newsweek, Nov. 12, 1990, p. 58. 
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stagnated, and the nation's external debt exceeded $100 billion. From 1980 to 1988, Mexico paid 
$84 billion in interest on this debt, another $46 billion in principal, and still owed some $102 
billion. \0 The peso was devalued from 26 to $1 in 1982 to more than 1000 to $1 and these 
devaluations fueled an annual inflation of 60%. In 1988, approximately half the population 
consumed less than the minimum 2000 calories required daily for nutrition and labored in the 
informal sector of the economy. Real wages haddecreased by nearly 40% since 1982 and 
millions · of Mexican's sought relief by illegally emigrating to the United States. 11 All this set the 
stage for NAFT A de facto and de jure. 
NAFTA: defacto and dejure 
In light of what has transpired in Mexico since 1982, it is difficult to understand how 
journalists, politicians, and much of the general public was surprised when NAFTA changed in 
one year from a "win, win" proposition to one of "lose, lose." They claimed they were never 
forewarned about the pitfalls ofNAFTA or of potential problems in the Mexican economy. But 
alternative investigations and evaluations ofNAFTA had been published and made available to 
all those who bothered to look for them outside of the government- and corporate-dominated 
information systems. 12 Those who were shocked by the NAFTA-induced Mexican devaluation 
and financial crisis obviously had relied upon the analyses ofNAFTA proponents such as in this 
"intelligence": 
On Dec. 16, a group of nearly 50 US intelligence analysts, Wall Street financiers and 
academic experts gathered at the State Department for an unusual, closed-door discussion 
of the Mexican economy. The consensus was upbeat: Mexico could solve its problems in 
1995. Three days later Mexico's economy began a free-fall from which it has yet to fully 
10 World Banle 1989. World Debt Tables, 1989-90, Washington, DC, p. 254. 
11 Lustig, Nora. 1992. Mexico: The Remaking of an Economy, Washington, DC, The 
Brookings Institute; Riding, Allan. 1984. Distant Neighbors, New York, Alfred A. Knopf; Pool, 
John C. And Stamos, Steve. 1987. "The Mexican debt crisis: a case study," The ABCs of 
International Finance, D.H. Heath & Co., Lexington, Mass. 
12 In addition to other works cited here, see, Melvin Burke, "The human costs of 
NAFTA," The Humanist, vol. 53, no .5, Sept/Oct., 1993; Pat Choate, Save Your Job: Save Your 
Country New York, Hyperion Press, 1993. 
31 
recover. 13 
As it turned out, the Zapatistas were better social scientists, economic forecasters, and 
politicians than this anny of experts employed first to rationalize, then to justify, and now to 
apologize for the Agreement. They understood that the pro-market reforms of Salinas, referred to 
here as NAFTA de jacto, had worsened them economically, socially, and politically prior to 
January 1, 1994. They also were forewarning the world that NAFTA dejure would not be 
beneficial for anyone except the wealthy, the multinational corporations, and conservative 
politicians. 14 
NAFTA's economic policies of tariff-free trade, unrestrained foreign investment, 
privatization, and deregulation were implemented in all three countries years before the 
Agreement became the law of the land. Reaganomics in the United States, the Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) between Canada and the US, President Salinas' "modernization" of Mexico, 
as well as the maquiladora l5 program, are all forerunners to the legal NAFTA. Therefore, a 
de facto NAFT A has been in existence since at least the mid-1980s. It began in the United States, 
was extended to Canada, and finally imposed upon the Mexicans. 16 Everywhere the effect of 
these neo-liberal economic policies was the same. The promised benefits were overstated, 
income and wealth were redistributed, and all associated costs were attributed to factors other 
thanNAFTA. 
13 The Washington Post National Weekly Edition. 1995. "Washington's siesta," Feb. 
20-26. 
14 See "Text of declaration from the Lacandon Jungle from the Zapatista National 
Liberation Army," Internet (Peacenet) 
15 Maquiladoras are multinational corporate assembly plants located on the Mexican side 
of the USlMexican border. Virtually all capital equipment, raw material, and component parts are 
imported from the United States. More than 90% of the production of these plants is exported 
from Mexico, predominately to the United States, and is taxed only on the value added. 
16 "But perhaps the most common political technique of British expansion was the treaty 
of free trade and friendship with or imposed upon a weaker state." Quoted from John Gallagher 
and Ronald Robinson in International Political Economy, (eds.) Jeffery A. Frieden and David A. 
Lake, New York, St. Martins Press, 1987, p. 123. 
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In Mexico, de facto NAFT A began with the IMF stabilization programs after 1982, was 
extended when the country entered the GAIT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) in 
1986, and reached its zenith with President Salinas' economic reforms of 1988-1994. These 
orthodox, neo-liberal policies were imposed upon Mexico by the International Monetary Fund 
shortly after the country's 1982 debt crisis and have since been made permanent national policy 
by NAFTA.'7 Among these pro-market policies, Mexico's average tariff was reduced to 10% and 
billions of dollars of capital gains from privatization were realized from the sale ofTELMEX 
and other public enterprises in Mexico. Stocks on the Mexican exchange increased seven fold in 
value between 1989 and 1994. The nwnber of maquiladoras (multinational corporate assembly 
plants) along the USlMexican border was vastly expanded; the ejidos (small peasant farms) were 
removed from Constitutional protection and decreased in nwnbers, size, and economic viability. 
Combined, all this and more gave rise to levels of land and wealth concentration not seen since 
the pre-revolutionary days of Porfirio Diaz. When Salinas asswned the presidency, Mexico had 
only one billionaire; today it has twenty-four, more than any other nation except the United 
States, Germany, and Japan. 18 But such meteoric increases in stock values and wealth plus 
income concentration are not considered financial crises. 
This wealth accwnulation was not the result of increased production or productivity, nor 
will it "trickle down" to the people. An estimated 40 million Mexicans live in extreme poverty, 
about half the country suffers from malnutrition, and the purchasing power of the workers 
decreased by an estimated 60% since 1982. Moreover, fully half of Mexico's economically active 
population is employed in the informal sector, without regular jobs, social benefits, or labor 
17 See Melvin Burke, "The beginning of the end of the IMF game plan: the case of 
Mexico" in Public Administration Economics and Finance, Edgar Ortiz, (ed.), Mexico City, 
CrDE & NAEF A, 1988-1989, and Nora Lustig, Mexico: the Remaking of an Economy, 
Washington, DC, The Brookings Institute, 1992. 
18 "Mexico's elite like ruling party agenda," Globe and Mail, Toronto, Canada, January 
24,1994, p. IB; John Ross, "After elections, apocalypse?" The Nation, August 8-15,1994, p. 
158. 
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protection. 19 Mexican peasants were big losers in this historic redistribution and restructuring of 
the Mexican economy. Peasant lands were placed in the trust of ejidos by the Agrarian Reform 
Law and the Constitution of 1917. These lands, which account for about half of Mexico's 
territory, were privatized by President Salinas in the Land Reform Act of 1991, which overturned 
Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution.20 Subsidies to traditional peasant farming communities 
were eliminated and free trade in com, coffee, and sugar depressed local prices and rendered their 
small farms uneconomical. These and other market reforms made it possible for large 
landholders to evict Indians from their traditional lands in Chiapas and elsewhere, thereby 
expropriating nearly half the arable land in Mexico.21 Twenty-five percent of Mexico's registered 
land disputes are in the state ofChiapas. Of the 500,000 indigenous Mayas in the country, half 
are illiterate, more than 90% of the children suffer from malnutrition, and nearly all are poor 
according to the UN and other official reports.22 Massive illegal migration to the United States is 
one outcome of all this and the Zapatista armed rebellion is another. 
19 David Brooks, "Mexico's future hinges on political and economic reforms," and 
Adolfo Aquilar Zinser, "Free trade: prosperity for the few or development for the majority," 
reprinted in Trading Freedom: How Free Trade Affects Our Lives, Work and Environment, John 
Cavanagh, et.al. (eds.) Institute for Food and Development and Institute for Policy Studies, 
Montpelier, Vermont, Capital City Press, 1992, pp. 50-54. 
20 A World Bank. report explained that "certification (privatization) coupled with Mexico's 
reduction of agricultural subsidies and its entrance into the North American Free Trade 
Agreement will lead to even lower productivity because the measures force many 
non-competitive growers out of the market." "Private sector fails to bailout farmers," El 
Financiero, International, Mexico City, January 31-February 6,1994, p. 3. 
21 "In recent years the migration from rural areas has grown as crop prices have fallen 
50% in real terms .. .. Mexico now imports 10 million tons of agricultural products annually, 
equivalent to one third of its food consumption. The import bill would be higher were it not for 
the fact that per capita consumption of basic foods has fallen by 30% over the last eight years, 
due to the 60% decline in real wages and high urban unemployment." Ecumenical Coalition for 
Economic Justice, "Free trade won't help Mexico's poor," in Trading Freedom, pp. 55-57. 
22 "Indians continue to suffer poverty and discrimination," Interpress Service/Spanish 
Peacenet, February 17, 1994; "UN cites 15 million indigenous poor," El Financiero 
International, Mexico City, March 21-27,1994, p. 2. 
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Canada's ordeal with its de facto NAFT A, the Free Trade Agreement (PTA) signed with 
the United States in 1989, parallels the 1994 NAFTA, which is modeled after the earlier 
agreement. When the Free Trade Agreement was being publicly debated in 1988, neoclassical 
economists forecasted that it would generate 250,000 additional jobs in Canada and induce an 
8% annual growth rate. Instead, within five years, Canada had lost more than 400,000 high-wage 
manufacturing jobs, the Canadian dollar had been devalued more than 30%, and the nation's 
economy had stagnated. Its federal budget deficit now equals about 5% of its Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), its total governmental debt equals GDP, and Moody's Investors Service has 
downgraded the country's credit rating.23 Canada, like Mexico, was introduced to free trade years 
before NAFTA became law and experienced many of the same negative consequences. If the 
Mexican experience did not alert the world to the perils ofNAFTA, then the Canadian 
experience should have done so. 
NAFT A is not free trade 
NAFT A is not a free trade agreement at all. Exaggerated claims that the agreement will 
enhance trade, expand markets, and increase competition are founded upon abstract theory under 
conditions which do not remotely approximate reality on the North American continent. NAFTA 
is precisely the opposite of free trade. It is the creation of a North American trade block- a 
protectionist mechanism. The agreement was designed to achieve the new international, strategic 
trade policy goals of American multinational corporations. Figure 1 illustrates the triad of global 
trade blocks of the United States, the European Common Market, and Japan. NAFTA is but an 
expansion of the dominant US block in the global triad of foreign investment, production, and 
trade. 
23 "Moody's downgrades Canada's rating, pressuring government to reduce debt," The 
Wall Street Journal, April 13, 1995, pp. A2 and A4. 
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FIGURE 1: FOREIGN TRADE I INVESTMENT TRIAD 
EUROPEAN 
PERIPHERY 
AMERICAN 
PERIPHERY 
UNITED STATE 
(NAFTA) 
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JAPAN 
JAPANESE 
PERIPHERY 
The doctrine of free trade assumes (1) capital immobility between countries, (2) full 
employment and (3) perfect competition within all countries. If these conditions exist, then 
tariff-free trade in goods will theoretically increase country specialization, exploit existing 
comparative advantages among nations, globalize efficiency, increase world output, and raise 
living standards.24 NAFTA was not founded on this ideal, nor was it crafted to achieve these 
objectives. On the contrary, NAFTA was designed explicitly to reduce country specialization, 
create new comparative advantages, exclude foreign competition, and enhance multinational 
corporate expansion. The two overall objectives ofNAFTA are: (1) to protect the continental 
markets from further European and Asian encroachment in the short run, and (2) to enhance the 
global share and monopoly power of American multinational corporations in the long run. 
NAFT A, as such, is intended to restore the international order of yester-year, the early 
post-WWII era of United States global hegemony. 
By establishing a North American common market, NAFTA closely follows the policy 
prescriptions of the new international economics25, a more contemporary and pragmatic trade 
theory which tells us that an economy can only grow and compete internationally if it pursues a 
strategic trade policy. This theory calls for active government intervention in international trade 
by creating, subsidizing and protecting industries which have unique attributes such as increasing 
returns to scale, external economies and advanced technology. Industries which produce goods 
with high income elasticities of demand are also singled out for preferential treatment. The 
objective here is not global growth through free trade, but global redistribution via protection and 
subsidies. A neglected fact is that although international trade has been increasing under FT A, 
NAFT A, and GAIT, total global output and income have been decreasing. In 1993, the last year 
of complete data, the World Trade Organization reported that global trade increased by 4% while 
24 For a contemporary summary and assessment of this doctrine, see Robert E. Prasch, 
"Reassessing comparative advantage: the impact of capital flows on the argument for 
laissez-faire," Journal of Economic Issues, June, 1995. 
25 For more on this theory and policy, see Paul Krugman (ed.) Strategic Trade Policy and 
The New International Economics, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1986. 
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world output registered zero growth.26 Expanding global free trade is a strategy of the 
multinational corporations in the dominant trade blocks to obtain a larger share of a smaller pie. 
What we have here is, at best, global redistribution. The United States, as a country, appears to 
be losing this international competition inasmuch as it suffered a record monthly merchandise 
trade deficit of $12.23 billion in January 1995, including a deficit of nearly $1 billion with 
Mexico and $3 billion with Canada?7 These trade deficits, however, do not adversely impact 
upon American multinational corporate profits. The reason for this anomaly is that an estimated 
40% of international trade today is composed of intra-corporate transactions. Approximately 
30% of imports to the United States are the exports of US-based corporate subsidiaries located 
abroad. The percentages are even greater for NAFTA trade. Multinational corporations, 
paradoxically, benefit both from exports and imports-they "win, win." This explains how the 
US Department of Commerce can optimistically report ''NAFTA Facts" such as these: 
Trade among the NAFT A partners (US, Canada, Mexico) soared 17% in 1994, growing 
over $50 billion in just one year ... 
US merchandise exports to Canada and Mexico grew twice as fast as us exports to the 
rest of the world (16.4% vs. 7.5%), accounting for haljofthe 1994 gain in US exports ... 
N AFT A accounted for only $4 billion of the $36 billion overall deterioration in the US 
merchandise trade balance.28 
Free intra-corporate trade, not free international trade, is what FTA and NAFT A are all 
about. Accompanying this trade are transfer prices-not market prices-which corporate 
accounting departments alone determine. Thus the time has come to develop macroeconomic 
theory models with multinational corporations, not nation states, as the aggregate economic unit 
26 "World exports of goods rose 9% in '94, outpacing the growth of production," The Wall 
Street Journal, April 4, 1995, pp. A2 and A8. 
27 "US trade deficit soars to record," The New York Times, March 23,1995, pp. Al and 
D7. 
28 "NAFTA: first year snapshot," US Department of Commerce, NAFTA Facts, Document 
No. 4003. 
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and focus of inquiry. Only then, perhaps, can we begin to understand the New World Order and 
its revision of economic theory, including free trade. Countries don't invest and trade, 
corporations do. 
NAFT A: Perceptions, illusions, and reality 
We have seen that NAFTA is neither new nor a free trade agreement. We also shall see 
that NAFTA (de/acto and dejure) was not designed for and did not create new markets, increase 
productive investment, or generate employment in the newly integrated North American markets. 
The "win, win" benefits ofNAFTA are little more than neoclassical free trade fables, corporate 
public relations craftiness, and government deception. What they failed to tell the public was that 
these benefits, if they materialized, would profit the multinational corporations and the costs of 
NAFTA would be shouldered by the rest of society. This reality has been disguised by 
proponents ofNAFTA by (1) altering the semantics of economics, (2) manipulating statistics, 
and (3) evoking excuses like "shocks" and the "long run." 
Illusion of market and trade expansion 
Assertions that NAFT A would expand markets and increase trade are not supported by 
either economic theory or the facts . NAFTA-induced capital movements across borders 
unquestionably altered the economies of the three nations, but the outcome is still largely 
indeterminate. The final outcome will depend upon the net effect of many economic changes. 
Nobody seriously disputes that NAFTA will radically alter the composition and patterns of trade 
as multinational corporations restructure and rationalize their production/distribution systems, 
and exercise their augmented power in Canada, Mexico, and the US. Throughout the world, 
existing trade and markets will continue to be changed by NAFT A. 
Rather than creating new markets and increasing trade, NAFTA actually redistributed 
trade, production, and income and structurally altered markets--domestically, regionally, and 
globally. The more complex reality ofNAFTA is better understood visually. In Figure 2, the 
market area where all three economies converged prior to the Agreement represents the 
integrated North American common market. The other two areas (FTA and MEX-USA) 
represent the integrated markets of only two countries. Combined, they represent what I call 
NAFTA de/acto. The remaining areas of the three circles depict the national, domestic sectors of 
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those economies that are not integrated with the other two countries. These market areas are not 
drawn to scale, nor do their boundary lines imply complete separation or isolation. The Mexican 
economy, for example, is less than 5% the size of the US economy. 
Figure 2: N AFT A de facto Integration 
USA 
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Figure 3 shows that after NAFTA became law, the North American common market 
expanded, displaced, and absorbed additional domestic markets on the continent. The agreement 
gave rise to a convergence and expansion of th~ integrated markets in all three countries. 
Conversely, the domestic and non-integrated sectors of the three countries decreased in size after 
NAFTA. The aggregate North American markets and economy did not expand or contract, 
however, but remained the same. 
Figure 1 NAFTA oe jure Integration 
NAFTA 
Viewed from a slightly different perspective, NAFT A expanded the multinational 
corporate sectors in North America while the domestic sectors were absorbed or displaced. In the 
process, foreign investment was substituted for domestic investment, foreign production for 
domestic output, and foreign trade for domestic trade. Because open and free competition among 
unequals always benefits the largest and the strongest, this redistribution favored the most 
powerful country (the United States), the largest business entities (the multinational 
corporations), and the most privileged individuals (the wealthy). "There is as much injustice in 
the equal treatment of unequal cases as there is in the unequal treatment of equal cases," said 
Aristotle.29 In this instance, the diagrams help to visualize NAFT A for what it really is, a 
redistribution and protectionist trilateral agreement. 
We do not see this reality because it is not in the interest of those who benefit from the 
agreement that we do. For example, the corporate-owned and controlled press30 today often refers 
to the integrated North American economy as the "domestic economy," or even as the US 
economy. When there is an overall increase in automobile production or corporate profits, 
skillful use of economic semantics makes it difficult to see that there are corresponding decreases 
in national output, income, or employment in one or more of the three countries to the 
Agreement. In such scenarios, only the aggregate, positive economic figures are reported in the 
media and official statistics. For example, news reports such as "US Gains in Vehicle 
Output"JI obscure the fact that the US lead in vehicle production is due to Japanese 
multinationals increasing their production in America, that much of the increased output is from 
Canada and Mexico, and that no vehicle is completely produced in anyone country in today's 
global economy. Conversely, when the integrated North American economy perfonns poorly and 
only one of the three national economies perfonns well, it is that country's economy alone which 
29 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachaea. See also, Robert E. Prasch, "Towards a 'general theory' 
of market exchange," Journal of Economic Issues, Sept., 1995. 
30 Chomsky, Noam. 1994. "The role of the media in manufacturing consent," Institute of 
Policy Alternatives of Montreal, videocassette, Black Rose Books. 
31 The New York Times, Dec. 29,1994, p. C2. 
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makes the news and NAFTA is given credit. Finally, when all three national economies 
experience problems such as increased unemployment, increased poverty, or negative growth, 
external "shocks," not NAFTA, are the designated cUlprits. Typical shocks include currency 
devaluations, interest rate increases, and recessions. None of them is related or attributed to free 
trade. Canada's present economic difficulties are officially the result of recession, not FTA or 
NAFT A. And Mexico's current financial crisis is the result of imprudent government devaluation 
of the peso. 
In this New World Order crafted by multinational corporations, NAFTA is never held 
accountable for economic problems, anywhere. In a like manner, when a Senora automobile 
plant in Mexico imports parts and equipment from the USA and then re-exports the assembled 
cars and trucks back to the United States, these transactions are registered as net increases in 
trade with no accounting taken of the decrease in domestic automobile trade between Michigan 
and the other forty-nine states. The impression given, therefore, is that international trade always 
augments domestic trade and that exports create employment regardless of imports. Nothing 
could be further from the truth. 
Unproductive finance 
Finance, capital, and investment are difficult concepts. There are many different types 
and numerous definitions. These include the monetary, the abstract, and the real; private and 
public; domestic and foreign; productive and unproductive. Needless to say, this complexity 
leads to confusion and opens the door to analytical abuse. Nowhere is it more apparent than in 
the case ofNAFTA. This is not the place for a lengthy discussion of this subject, but we can 
make sense of it all. 
NAFTA, having little to do with free trade, is a trilateral agreement primarily designed to 
promote the movement of capital across borders. As such, it is basically a treaty to promote 
private investment, capital gains, and profits for multinational corporations and those who own 
them. Much of the foreign investment flow occurred during the NAFT A de facto years 
(1988-1993) and has been increasing in recent years. United States corporations doubled their 
investments in Canada between 1986 and 1990, from about $50 billion to more than $100 
billion. Investment Canada reported a record 1,403 corporate takeovers of Canadian-owned 
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companies during 1988 and 1989 for a total of $30.5 Billion.32 Uncounted billions of dollars 
were also invested in the Mexican stock market after privatization. From 1989 to 1994, stock 
values increased seven-fold fueled by the privatization ofTELMEX, which alone accounts for 
about 40% of the market. TELMEX was sold for $3.7 billion dollars and today has an estimated 
stock value of $30 billion. Additional billions were invested in maquiladoras on the US border 
and in retail chain franchises throughout Mexico. Franchises increased from ten in 1990 to 125 
(with 950 outlets) in 1992 and 160 in 1994.33 Maquiladoras increased from just a few hundred to 
2,300 in 1995 and employ more than 600,000 workers. US automobile manufacturers also 
invested $11.6 billion in Mexican plants from 1988 to 1992.34 
All this private investment does not include other significant capital flows into Mexico 
during the period in addition to public loans, debt swaps, and debt rescheduling. It is probably 
not an overstatement to say that without the "Brady Plan" there would have been no NAFT A. 
This plan, proposed by Nicholas Brady, former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, asked creditor 
banks individually to choose between three alternative deals concerning $48.5 billion of 
Mexico's external debt: (1) swap old debt for new, (2) cut the face value ofloans, (3) cut the rate 
of interest on loans to Mexico.35 Thanks to this plan, Mexico's debt was reduced by $6.9 billion 
and, more importantly, annual net payments to its creditors were reduced by $4 billion a year 
32 Bruce Campbell, "Beggar thy neighbor," reprinted in Trading Freedom, p. 38. 
33 Among these franchises are WaiMart, J C Penney, and Taco Bell. No statistics are 
available on the number of Mexican workers displaced as a result of the small business 
bankruptcies these franchises generated. 
34 "Detroit south: Mexico's auto boom, who wins, who loses," Business Week, March 16, 
1992, pp. 98-103; "A revolution already in progress," The Washington Post National Weekly 
Edition, June 1-7, 1992, pp. 6-9. 
35 Despite these debt reduction measures, Mexico has always been defined as a "severely 
indebted country" by the International Monetary Fund because the present value of its debt 
service to GNP has exceeded 50% and the present value of debt service to exports has exceeded 
150% since 1982. 
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between 1989 and 1994.36 This massive inflow of financial capital, combined with more than $30 
billion of treasury bonds (tesobonos), enabled President Salinas to maintain an overvalued peso, 
disguise (repress) inflation, quadruple imports from the US, finance. large trade deficits, and sell 
NAFT A to Americans both north and south of the border. After all, the argument went, Mexican 
trade deficits create jobs in the export sectors of the US economy. Was this game plan 
sustainable and was the finance productive; i.e., did it create new productive capacity, generate 
employment, and increase output in Mexico? The answer is a resounding "no." 
The reason is more-or-Iess self-explanatory. Virtually all of these investments were 
predominately for privatization, financial speculation, corporate mergers Goint ventures), and the 
purchase of imports. A significant portion of these imports were used to buy capital goods and 
intennediate goods for re-exportation. For example, in 1994 Business Week reported that Mexico 
had received $81 billion in new capital inflows since 1991, but only $15 billion was direct 
foreign investment.37 Multinational corporations entered into joint ventures, merged, and divided 
the markets, rather than compete with one another and create new markets. They entered into 
competition only with small domestic businesses.38 International corporate mergers and 
monopolization, not competition, is what NAFTA encouraged.39 Multinational franchises 
displaced more competitive, more labor intensive, independent businesses in all three countries. 
The illusion given was that all investment, regardless of type, is socially beneficial and creates 
36 Christophe Gevisier, "Towards a North American free-trade area," unpublished masters 
thesis, University of Fribourg, Switzerland, July, 1992, pp. 71-72. 
37 Geri Smith, Elizabeth Weiner, and Elisabeth Malkin, "Mexico: How the election will 
reshape the economy," Business Week, August 22, 1994, p. 47. 
38 In Mexico, US-based Anheuser-Busch Cos. Inc., recently purchased 17.7% of 
Cerveceria Modelo, and Canada's John Labatt Ltd., brewery acquired 22% ofFemsa Cerveza, 
parent company of Cerveceria Cuauhtemoc Monctezuma. Femsa also owns the Coca-Cola 
franchise in Mexico. "Competition coming to a head," Dallas Morning News, July 22, 1994, 
p.10. 
39 Global competition also was reduced by the 60% component requirement (rule of 
origin provision). This excludes other foreign corporations from the benefits of tariff-free 
NAFTA trade unless they produce on the continent. 
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capacity, output, and employment which furthers competition and generates growth. The data 
and facts reveal otherwise. 
Manipulation of biased statistics is another tactic to disguise the impact ofNAFTA. 
Again, as with trade and markets, gross net changes in investment were officially recorded and 
made public. For example, when the automobile plant moved from Michigan to Senora the 
increased real investment in Mexico was recorded at full value and heralded as yet another 
example ofNAFTA success. In the United States, much of the decrease in investment was 
recorded as tax write-offs on plants and equipment and reported in the news as structural 
downsizing deemed necessary and inevitable by international competition. Likewise, 
disinvestment in the Mexican public sector through privatization and the innwnerable small 
businesses displaced by multinational corporations were ignored. Finally, estimates of economic 
growth use data that is market-biased because it is not discounted for inflation or population 
increases, or both. No comparable, unambiguous statistics of economic growth are available in 
this the age of information. Such imaginative uses of economic semantics and biased statistics 
give the illusion ofNAFT A "win, win" growth when the reality is "lose, lose" redistribution. 
Were NAFTA economic semantics not distorted and if a proper accounting of 
dis-savings, dis-investment, and unproductive financial speculation in Mexico accurately 
reported, the recent devaluation of the peso and financial crisis would not have been surprises. 
Economists, above all others, should have known and informed the public that (1) Mexico's 
privatization and foreign trade deficits were dis-investments, (2) as little as $1 for every $100 
traded on the stock and bond market resulted in productive investment,40 and (3) financing trade 
deficits with speculative financial capital from abroad was not sustainable. What they have yet to 
grasp is that private capital flows of this type can hurt poor countries and de-stabilize global 
finance. 41 
40 Dean Baker, Robert Pollin, and Marc Schaberg, "Taxing the big casino," The Nation, 
May 9, 1994, pp. 622-624. 
41 "Private-capital flows can hurt poor nations," The Wall Street Journal, January 30, 
1995, p. AI. 
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Real, open and disguised unemployment 
Not only was the public misinformed about the financial realities of the agreement, a 
massive propaganda campaign sought to convince us that NAFTA was a jobs program, one that 
would create more employment in all three countries. The US International Trade Commission 
concluded that Mexico would be the big winner with a gain of 1,782,000 new jobs, a 6.6% 
increase. Estimated benefits for the United States ranged from 35,000 new jobs by 1995 to 
700,000 by the year 2000. Job displacements for the US ranged from a low of 145,000 by 1995 
to a high of 490,000 by 2000. Even Canada was expected to increase its employment because of 
NAFTA, although by only a modest 0.6%.42 These forecasts were based upon abstract 
econometric models using unrealistic assumptions to predict increased growth and expanded 
markets. Indeed, most of the models made no predictions at all with regard to the level of 
employment, but simply assumed full employment and its continuance in all three countries.43 
During the jobs debate that preceded signing of the Agreement in Fall 1993, virtually no 
reference was made to the prior experience of Canada, the USA, and Mexico with de facto 
NAFTA - that is, the 1988-1993 Free Trade Agreement and President Salinas' economic 
reforms. During these years, maquiladora and automobile industrialization in Mexico was but 
the flip side of corporate downsizing, re-engineering, and de-industrialization in Canada and the 
United States.44 Labor union activists recognize this as nothing more than old-fashioned 
run-away shops and speed-up on the assembly line. US multinational corporations created nearly 
as many new manufacturing jobs in Mexico under the maquiladora program between 1986 and 
42 Potential Impact on Us. Economy and Selected Industries of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, US International Trade Commission, Publication 2596, Washington, DC, 
January, 1993. 
43 O. Stanford, "Continental economic integration: modeling on the impact on labor," 
Annals of The American Academy of Political and SoCial SCience, March, 1993, pp. 92-110, 
Table 1. 
44 Michael Bernstein (ed.), Understanding American Economic Decline, Cambridge 
University Press, 1994. 
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1990 as they created in the United States.45 Canada's loss of nearly a half million manufacturing 
jobs after FT A and NAFT A is attributed to its current recession and corporate downsizing. 
Corporate restructuring in the newly integrated American markets dictates that costs be reduced 
by eliminating excess capacity, duplicating facilities, and by substituting inexpensive labor for 
high-wage labor. Because corporations and capital were made more internationally mobile by 
NAFTA, but not labor or labor unions, the transnational corporations have moved their facilities, 
first from higher wage Canada to lower wage United States and then from both to the subsistence 
wage environment of Mexico. Canadian manufacturing wages are estimated to be between 15-
30% higher than those in the United States. The US/Canadian wage of $14 to $24 per hour is 
nearly ten times the Mexican manufacturing wage of $2 to $3 per hour. Approximately 40% of 
Canadian and 15% of US workers are unionized, but Mexico has virtually no independent 
uruons. 
None of this implies that the Mexicans were big job winners or that employment and 
wages increased in Mexico since NAFT A. Increased employment in the maquiladoras and 
automobile production was more than offset by jobs lost through privatization, trade deficits, and 
labor-displacing technology. An exact accounting of these job losses is not possible, partly for 
reasons explained below. Nevertheless, Mexicans cannot take much comfort from the realization 
that their exports to the United States are crude petroleum and manufactures assembled from 
import components in foreign-owned plants. These factories have few domestic business 
linkages and use appropriate labor-displacing technology. Nearly all maquiladora production and 
approximately 50% of automobile production is exported.46 International franchise expansion 'in 
Mexico was more than matched by the shrinkage of domestic small businesses. In 1993 alone, 
45 Save Your Job: Save Your Country, p. 50. 
46 "Altogether, more than half of the US 'exports' to Mexico never entered Mexico's 
domestic market. More than 30% of the US exports to Mexico were tools and machines used to 
build more Mexican factories, mostly US-owned and mostly maquiladoras. Finally, less than $8 
billion of the $40.6 billion of US exports to Mexico in 1992 actually entered Mexico's consumer 
market." Save Your Job : Save Your Country, op. cit. 
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more than half a million manufacturing workers in Mexico reportedly lost jobs47 and real wages 
decreased 60% from 1986 to 1992.48 For those who expected multinational corporations to 
increase Mexican wages, it sho\.1ld be noted that the maquiladoras pay lower average wages than 
they did fifteen years ago and only half the average for all Mexican manufacturing.49 
Why was all this unemployment not obvious or a major political issue in the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico during the NAFTA debates? The answer is complex, but not 
incomprehensible. Large corporations have the mystique of being engines of growth and 
generators of jobs. Biased official statistics count only the jobs that corporations generate while 
disguising the unemployment they cause. Disguised unemployment has become an art fonn in 
the New World Order. In Canada and the United States, many displaced workers become part of 
the growing contingent (part time) labor force, become self-employed, or become discouraged 
workers and drop out of the labor force altogether. As a result, they are not included in the 
standard unemployment statistics. In Mexico, displaced workers and bankrupt small businessmen 
disappeared into the black hole of the informal sector of the economy, where they are obliged to 
earn their daily tortillas as street vendors, beggars, and servants. All increases in multinational 
corporate employment, on the other hand, are recorded in government statistics and heralded 
loudly in the press. 
A blatant example of official deception occurred when the US government reported on 
jobs created during the first six months ofNAFTA.50 The U.S. Department of Commerce 
"Summary of Trade Trends UnderNAFTA: January - June, 1994" released August 19, reported 
that "approximately 1.7 million more Americans were employed in June of 1994 than December 
47 "More than half a million workers lost manufacturing jobs in 1993," Interpress 
Service/Spanish Peacenet, March 10, 1994. 
48 Ecumenical Coalition for Economic Justice, "Free trade won't help Mexico's poor," 
Trading Freedom, pp. 55-57. 
49 "Towards a North American free trade area," p. 78. 
50 This case study was previously reported in Melvin Burke, Kraig A. Schwartz, and 
William G. Steele, "NAFTA numbers don't add up," The Humanist, March/April, 1995, pp. 5 and 
36. 
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of 1993, with exports to Mexico and Canada contributing up to an estimated 100,000 of these 
jobs." Job dislocations associated with the agreement were estimated at 4,820. 
These are called "NAFTA Facts."51 From the garbled data presented it is unclear how this 
conclusion was arrived at. Exports of autos from the United States and Canada were cited, but no 
figure was provided for automobile imports from Mexico. The positive $1.1 billion US balance 
of trade surplus with Mexic052 was applauded, while the negative US balance of trade deficit of 
$5.8 with Canada was ignored. Combined, this trade data revealed that the United States 
imported $4.8 billion more from its NAFTA partners than it exported to them during the first six 
months of 1994. International trade theory tells us that while increases in exports create 
employment for a country, increases in imports generate unemployment.53 Only in the new 
calculus ofNAFTA do both exports and imports generate employment and nowhere do imports 
substitute for domestic production or increase unemployment. Such reporting is designed to 
support Commerce Secretary Ronald H. Brown's press statements that NAFTA is living up to its 
promise as a win-win-win situation. The press then repeats these ''NAFTA facts." 
A more accurate analysis of the US Commerce Department data reveals a net loss of 
employment in the United States as a result ofthe first six months ofNAFTA. The US exported 
an additional $8.4 billion to Canada and Mexico during this time and imported $9.5 billion more, 
for a net increase in imports of $1 .1 billion. Using the Hufbauer and Schott calculation of 19,600 
job losses per $1 billion increase in imports, the United States experienced a 21,560 job loss 
51 "Summary of trade trends under NAFTA: January-June, 1994," US Department of 
Commerce, NAFTA Facts, August 19,1994. 
52 Mexico does not include US imports into the maquiladora sector in its trade balance, 
even though they approximate 20% of its total imports from the United States. Mexico therefore 
also recorded an official trade surplus with the US during the first six months ofNAFT A. 
53 Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott, "North American free trade: issues and 
recommendations," Washington, Institute for International Economics, 1992, cited in The 
Employment Effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement, National Commission for 
Employment Policy, Special Report No. 33, Washington, DC, US Department of Labor, October, 
1992, Appendix C, p. 7. 
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from NAFT A during the first half-year of its implementation. 54 The press headlines should have 
read "Initial NAFTA Results Show Jobs Losses for Americans." Three months later, the US 
Department of Commerce reported more of the same: "We estimate that there would have been 
130,000 fewer US jobs in the third quarter had we not had the surge in US exports to Mexico this 
year.".55 
All this occurred before the Mexican devaluation of the peso and the subsequent Mexican 
financial default. Today only the experts still believe NAFTA will generate employment in this 
country, Mexico, or Canada. All the projections now are estimates ofNAFTA unemployment 
and negative growth. By March 1995, Mexico had registered a trade surplus with the United 
States and Federal Reserve Board economists projected a one-half percent decrease in the US 
growth rate and job loss estimates of 380,000 to 500,000 over the next couple of years. 56 
Mexican small businesses, which employ an estimated 90% of the country's workforce, are 
falling into bankruptcy in record numbers and unemployment is skyrocketing. Only three months 
after the peso devaluation, Mexican job losses were estimated at between 240,000 and 500,000 
for the first quarter of 1995. For 1995, Mexico's GDP was expected to decrease by 2%, official 
unemployment to be between one and three million, and the future of the economy to be 
negative.57 
54 The Wall Street Journal published a 12-page review ofNAFTA on October 28,1994. 
In one of the articles, Gary Hufbauer said nothing about the number of jobs created. On April 
17, 1995, (p. AI), however-after the Mexican devaluation of the peso--the Journal reported 
him as saying, "The best figure for the jobs effect ofNAFTA is approximately zero .. .. The 
lesson for me is to stay away from job forecasting." 
55 "NAFTA: the first nine months," US Department of Commerce, NAFTA Facts, 
Document No. 4006. 
56 "Mexican crisis to hurt US economy with substantial loss of jobs, exports," The Wall 
Street Journal, Feb. 24, 1995, p. AI; "Peso's plunge may cost thousands of US jobs," New York 
Times, Jan. 30, 1995, p. C3 . 
57 "Industries devastated by plummeting sales," InterPress Service (PeaceNet), April 5, 
1995; "Manufacturers announce the impossibility of generating employment," InterPress Service 
Spanish (PeaceNet), March 8, 1995; "Mexican jobless rate at 8-year high," Dallas Morning 
News, March 23, 1995, p. Dl. 
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It must be noted that approximately one-half of the Mexican labor force is in the informal 
sector and is not counted as employed or unemployed. Of those in the formal sector, only 3.7% 
are officially listed as unemployed.58 Although tariffs were reduced by 10%, the Mexican VAT 
(sales) tax was increased by 50%, and inflation is expected to increase by more than 40%. So 
much for the price reductions and consumer benefits ofNAFTA. Manufacturing wages in the 
maquiladoras and auto plants also have decreased by 40%, but profits are up. The government 
announced more privatization, budget cuts, and other IMF austerity measures which will worsen 
the unemployment situation in the months and years ahead. 
Now that the financiers have reaped their profits, thanks in large part to the Clinton bail 
out, the industrialists will have their tum. The true "giant sucking sound" ofNAFTA is not US 
jobs going South to Mexico, as Ross Perot predicted, but profit income flowing North while 
Mexican workers struggle to survive. Mexico's minimum wage, after a 12% increase in April 
1995, is $2.70, an estimated one third of what it was in 1976 when discounted for inflation. The 
increase in unemployment and poverty in Mexico, as in the US,59 has given rise to more crime 
and drug smuggling.60 Mexicans can look forward to expanding employment opportunities in 
welfare, drug abuse treatment, law enforcement, and other service industries. Yet the NAFTA 
legacy of financial losses, decreased growth, and rising unemployment is probably 
underestimated, if the past is any guide to the future. The Wall Street Journal nevertheless 
reported that US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor "argues gamely that NAFTA didn't cause 
58 "Business fact sheet: Mexico," US Department of Commerce, NAFTA Facts, Document 
No. 8101. 
59 Mary Merva and Richard Fowles, "Effects of diminished economic opportunities on 
social stress: heart attacks, strokes, and crime," Report from the Economic Policy Institute, 
Washington, DC. 
60 "Mexico City crime soars as economic crisis worsens," Houston Chronicle, April 2, 
1995, p. A28; "Mexican cartels expanding role in trafficking," Washington Post, March 12, 
1995, p. AI; "Mexicans ask how far social fabric can stretch," New York Times, March 12, 1995, 
p. AI. 
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Mexico's problems but can help solve them."61 
Conclusion 
NAFTA did not begin on January 1, 1994, but rather, many years earlier in 1988 with the 
CanadianJUSA Free Trade Agreement and with President Carlos Salinas de Gortari's economic 
reforms. The latest Mexican crisis is but the historic continuation of its 1982 debt crisis. Both are 
part of the larger global stagnation crisis which began in the 1970s and continues today. NAFTA 
is not a free trade agreement, but rather the creation of a North American trade block, designed 
and implemented by American multinational corporations to obtain a greater share of a stagnant 
global output. It is not a "win, win" bargain of benefits for all, but rather a "lose, lose" deal 
which redistributes wealth and income from the mass of the American peoples to a few wealthy 
international property owners. This reality is obscured, distorted, and denied by conservative 
politicians and the corporate-dominated press, a deception which continues despite mounting 
evidence to the contrary in all three countries. 
History will record that NAFTA was a mechanism which encouraged unproductive 
financial capital movements across borders and in tum created greater unemployment and 
poverty in Canada, the US, and Mexico. Public relations terms like modernization, international 
competition, free trade, and bail-out are used to disguise the reality ofNAFTA. To grasp the 
truth ofNAFTA, one must recognize the rhetoric and disguised politics inherent in each of these 
buzz words. But no amount of rhetoric, disguised politics and public relations can conceal the 
fact that NAFTA is an instrument designed to produce winners and losers, with no mechanism 
for the former to compensate the latter. 
Beyond this, the NAFTA ordeal should teach us all that we would be better informed if 
we listened to ordinary people like the Chiapa peasants and workers. It appears that the Mexican 
authorities are once again, as in the past, turning a deaf ear to the workers. They canceled the 
May Day parade in 1995 to prevent a recurrence of the 1984 May Day incident when angry 
61 "Free trade is headed for more hot debate," The Wall Street Journal, April 17, 1995, p. 
AI. 
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workers threw Molotov cocktails at the president.62 
Incredibly, in view of the failures ofNAFTA, the three governments to the agreement are 
now integrating Chile into the North American trade block. This action, and the failure of the 
anti-NAFTA coalition to regroup, demonstrate the extraordinary power of the multinational 
corporations to set national and international economic policy. Instead of renegotiating or 
terminating NAFT A, current political initiatives are to encourage multinational corporations 
voluntarily to adopt basic labor standards abroad,63 to seek 0-7 approval of measures to increase 
transparency, and to increase IMF surveillance of developing countries' economies.64 The New 
World Order looks increasingly like the old one. 
62 "Amid crisis, Mexico cancels May Day parade," Houston Chronicle, April 10, 1995, p. 
A8. 
63 Among them are a ban on child labor, a minimum wage, workplace safety law and the 
right of workers to organize. "Multinationals can aid some foreign workers," The Wall Street 
Journal, April 24, 1995, p. AI. 
64 "Trying to cool the 'hot money' game," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 
April 24-30, 1995, pp. 20-21. 
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